The Quad foreign ministers' reaffirmation of their shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, where sovereignty and territorial integrity are upheld, faces internal and external challenges. However, the deepening bilateral relations between India and France are fostering a stabilizing Indo-Atlantic strategic partnership, which holds growing significance for both nations and the broader region.
France has quietly been a steadfast friend and ally to India, even before the Cold War's conclusion, and its role has only grown in prominence in the post-Cold War era. Decades before India acquired Rafale jets, it began procuring Mirage 2000 fighters from France as early as 1982-83—one of the most advanced aircraft of its time. Notably, this occurred six years before the Cold War formally ended, marked by the 1989 Malta Summit between Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush.
France has consistently supported India, including during critical moments such as the Pokhran-II nuclear tests. Unlike most P-5 nations, except for India’s traditional ally Russia, France refrained from condemning the tests. Instead, it maintained that the tests would not affect bilateral nuclear cooperation, even as the United States urged global allies to impose sanctions on India. This pattern of support was reaffirmed after the second round of nuclear tests in 1998.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to France aligns with India’s broader strategic outlook. Rather than signaling contradictions in India’s engagement with the Quad, it underscores the country’s long-standing practice of ‘strategic autonomy.’ Rooted in a Cold War-era policy of independence, this approach has evolved in the post-reform, post-Cold War era, driven by India’s growing economic and strategic capabilities.
Conventional Approach
External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar has consistently championed what he describes as a ‘non-conformist’ approach to foreign and security policy, distinguishing it from the ‘conformist’ stance that countries like the United States and other Western powers had traditionally expected from India. The Ukraine conflict, though unfortunate, offered India an opportunity to showcase its commitment to ‘robust strategic autonomy.’
India’s measured and cautious approach to gradually rebuilding pre-COVID, pre-Galwan relations with China can also be viewed through this lens, even if this perspective appears limited. Jaishankar reinforced the message of strategic independence when he emphasized that India reserves the right to decide how it acts or reacts on critical issues, regardless of external pressures from friendly nations.
France stood out as one of the few Western allies that refrained from pressuring India to stop purchasing affordable oil from Russia, which others argued was indirectly funding an ‘unjustifiable’ war. Despite France’s strong opposition to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, it respected India’s decision to chart its own path, even leveraging the geo-economic opportunities created by the geopolitical challenges in Europe.
At the same time, India maintained a neutral stance on the Ukraine war and did not openly defend Russia, unlike during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the past. Prime Minister Narendra Modi repeatedly conveyed to Russian President Vladimir Putin that “this is not an era of war” and urged both Russia and Ukraine to resolve their differences through dialogue. A similar message was shared with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reflecting India’s balanced and independent approach.
India's Area of Influence
It doesn't end there. French Reunion Island is located at the entrance to the southern Indian Ocean, from the Indian subcontinent to the open seas. With France deploying personnel and equipment on the island, as well as conducting occasional joint naval exercises with India in the region, Reunion could potentially serve as the first line of defense at the mouth of the Indian Ocean. This would complement India’s own military bases in the Andamans and Lakshadweep, strategically positioned on either side of the mainland.
The US’s more advanced Diego Garcia base lies at the center of what could be considered an ‘Indian pond.’ By most assessments, France seems open to this idea, although neither side has explicitly stated it. However, concerns remain about whether the US would accept describing this arrangement using the Cold War-era term of ‘India’s traditional sphere of influence.’
US President Donald Trump’s past remarks about merging Canada and Greenland with the US, urging Denmark to ‘sell’ Greenland, and even renaming the Gulf of Mexico as the ‘Gulf of America,’ pose challenges for India. In times of conflict, New Delhi may be forced to take a firm stance on such issues, momentarily setting aside the fact that Washington is a key ally, perhaps in comparison to others. Moreover, Trump has reignited his earlier threat to withdraw from transatlantic NATO, a position first suggested during his first term.
Nearer to India
Trump may have already brought the issue closer to India when his aides raised concerns about the emerging agreement between Mauritius and the UK regarding the ownership and sovereignty of the Chagos Islands. The US military base in Diego Garcia is situated there, and the MoU between Mauritius and the UK allowed Mauritius to lease Diego Garcia to the UK for 99 years in exchange for monetary compensation, after which the UK could lease it to the US.
Currently, the British leased Diego Garcia for 50 years in 1965, with a 20-year extension. Throughout lengthy proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN General Assembly (UNGA), and other negotiations, Mauritius had expressed a willingness to lease Diego Garcia directly to the US once its ownership was confirmed. The proposed arrangement between the UK and Mauritius, while a different approach, still leads to the same outcome, though the rights of Chagossians displaced by the US base in the past may have been overlooked.
It remains unclear why the Trump administration opposed the Chagos MoU ahead of the inauguration or whether the new administration will maintain the same stance. If so, it could pressure India to take a firm position, potentially without re-evaluating its current stance. India has already been a strong supporter of Mauritius’ claim in the UNGA, viewing it as the right move in the post-colonial era, and it is unlikely to reverse its position.
In this context, India will be closely monitoring developments involving Canada, Mexico, and Greenland, where the nations involved might elevate the US/Trump claim to the level of international politics, both within and outside the UNGA. Apart from the potential renaming of the Gulf of Mexico, these countries may be hesitant to bring the issue before the ICJ prematurely, but on this particular matter, countries bordering the Gulf, beyond just Mexico, may have their own perspectives.
India may also face a new challenge stemming from the Trump administration’s stance on the Gulf of Mexico. For the past decade, Chinese academics and state-run media have intermittently argued that the "Indian Ocean is not India’s Ocean." In the current geopolitical climate, some of India’s adversaries may encourage China to reignite this debate, especially if the Trump administration moves forward with its proposal to "rename" the Gulf of Mexico.
Adapting to Evolving Circumstances
It remains uncertain whether China will yield to such pressures amid the ‘changing circumstances’ in its bilateral relations with India. However, Beijing has shown discontent with the Quad foreign ministers' reaffirmation of their previous calls for 'open seas' and a 'rules-based order' in the maritime domain. In fact, Beijing has criticized the Quad foreign ministers' joint statement as 'coercion' in the Indo-Pacific, asserting that 'group politics… is not conducive to peace and stability,' and that any multilateral cooperation 'should not target any third party.'
Indians are also uneasy about the possibility of Trump wanting to, and actually resolving, trade issues with China—a problem that began during his first term as President. More concerning is the potential impact on the trilateral India-US-China dynamic, both in the near and distant future. This highlights the need for India to seek a new guarantor on the geopolitical front, as well as the geostrategic one, independent of geoeconomics. Unlike the US, France has been known to separate geo-economics from geopolitics and geostrategy.
This positions France as a second guarantor for India's long-term interests, complementing Russia, the traditional ally, which may be constrained by its political and strategic commitments in the Ukraine War and the resulting economic losses and compromises. While the US and the Quad remain key players in terms of geostrategy, the unpredictability of a Trump-led White House makes their future role uncertain, at least in theory.
This could prove significant in the coming months, years, and decades, just as it has in the past.
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